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POINT I
THE FACTS SHOW THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY
DROVE WHEN ALCOHOL IMPAIRED HER ABILITIES
Defendant's

argument that there

is no evidence

that drinking impaired her driving is not true.
blood alcohol level was .10.

(R. 601.)

Defendant's

After the accident,

defendant stated she was going to leave the scene without
waiting for police.

(R. 617, p. 23.)

She acted "as if she

had been drinking" (Id.) and had trouble standing up.
She had trouble locating her license.

(R. 60 3.)

(Id.)

She either

failed to honor a stop sign or pulled from that stop sign
without seeing an approaching car that was in plain sight.
(R. 617, p. 16.)

This is not a case where the sole evidence

of impairment is the fact that the legislative standard was
exceeded.
Defendant just came from a wine and cheese party.
(Defendant's Brief, p. 22.)

This is not a case where the

drinking occurred so long before the accident that it might
be argued

that the driver believed

purged

the

of

alcohol.

Defendant's

her

system had been

behavior

after

the

accident involving wanting to leave the scene, difficulty
finding

things,

and

difficulty

standing

conscious awareness of her condition.
alcohol impaired her driving ability.

further

shows

It also shows that

POINT II
DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
CAN BE CONDUCT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD
OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS REGARDLESS OF
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ACCIDENT OCCURS
OR THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THE STATUTORY LIMIT IS EXCEEDED
The trial court decided the punitive damages issue
on a summary judgment motion.

Therefore, it was defendant's

burden to show the reasonable men could not differ on the
facts.

Rule

56, Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

The

non-moving party need not prove his case in order to avoid a
summary judgment motion.
To sustain her burden, defendant did not present
any

expert

"slightly

testimony
drunk."

to

explain

Likewise,

her

concept

defendant

did

of

not

being
present

testimony to support her argument that her "slight intoxication" was neither malicious nor a contributing cause of the
accident.

Rather, defendant merely relies on inferences.

She infers that she was not "malicious" because her alcohol
level was only .02 percent above the legislative standard.
She further infers that the alcohol was not a contributory
factor because this was a typical kind of accident.
able men could draw contrary

inferences

Reason-

from the facts.

Defendant did not meet her burden of showing that no genuine
issue of fact existed.

2

Where

courts

minimum threshold

have

bothered

to

determine

for awarding punitive damages

some

in drunk

driving cases, most have determined that drunk driving, in
and of itself, is enough to get to the jury on punitive
damages.

Anderson v. Amundson, 354 N.W. 895

(Minn. App.

1984); Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406 (Io. 1974);
Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922

(Fla. 1976); Colligan v.

Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d
167 (N. Mex. App. 1971).
Punitive damages have also been awarded where the
degree of intoxication was unknown; not considered important
enough to be specified in the opinion; or where the issue of
intoxication was contested.
N.W.2d 406

Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347

(Io. 1984); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167

(N.M. 1970); Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973).
Additionally, alcohol can cause a driver to rear
end a car or cause some ordinary accident to occur as easily
as it can cause driving on the wrong side of the road.
Thus, punitive damages were awarded in rear-end collisions
in Holmes

v. Hollingsworth,

Higginbotham

v.

O'Keefe,

352

340

S.W.2d

S.W.2d

350

96

(Ark.

1961);

(Tex. Co. App.

1960); and Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922

(Fla. 1976).

They have been awarded in ordinary intersection accidents.
Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M. App. 1971) and where
there was a failure to yield the right-of-way.
Hunter,

343

F.Supp.

1284

(D. So.

3

Car.

1972).

Adams v«
Because

alcohol causes accidents to happen in every way imaginable,
there is no sense requiring that an alcohol related accident
occur in some particularly negligent manner before punitive
damages can be awarded.

No other court has imposed such a

requirement.
The

legislature

which creates a crime.
policy.

has

set a blood

alcohol

level

That legislation reflects public

Any requirement that an alcohol related accident

occur in a particular negligent manner would
with the legislature's policy.

be at odds

It would also be at odds

with the reality that alcohol can cause common accidents to
occur as well as more spectacular kinds of accidents.
The issue of whether the punitive damages standard
is satisfied is a jury question.
P.2d

37

(Utah

Comment d.

1980);

Elkington v. Fousty 618

Restatement

(Second)

Tortsf

§908,

If its is true the defendant was only "slightly"

drunk, that can be fairly argued to the jury.

The jury will

possibly

a

award

modest

"slightly" drunk.

punitive

damages

if

driver

is

In addition,it is for the jury to consid-

er whether there are sufficient mitigating factors present

Section 41-6-44(1), Utah Code Ann.;
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section
for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or
greater by weight, or who is under the infuence of alcohol
or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of
safely driving a vehcile, to drive or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state.

4

to award no punitive damages.

To hold as a matter of law

that drunk driving alone is not enough to get to the jury
would fly in the face of the expressed public policy of this
state and would involve the court in endless, arbitrary line
drawing.

POINT III
A JURY COULD FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT
FIT WITHIN UTAH'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE STANDARD
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701
P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); VonHake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah
1985);

and, Atkins, Wright and Miles v. Mountain

States

Telephone and Telegraph, 20 Utah Adv. Reports 20 (1985) were
all decided after McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678
P.2d

298

either

(Utah

1984).

actual malice

Each

case

expressly

(malice directed

states

at one

that

particular

person) or implied malice (reckless disregard of the rights
of others) can satisfy the punitive damage standard.
Defendant
within

the

implied

argues

that

her

malice

standard

knowingly intend to hurt plaintiff.
misses

the entire

implied malice.

distinction

conduct
because

cannot

fit

she did

not

However, that argument

between

actual malice

and

Knowing disregard of the rights of others

certainly may exist even though there is no conscious intent
to injure anyone.

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675

P.2d 1179, 1186-87 (Utah 1983).

5

Intentionally driving while under the influence of
alcohol
drive

and

drinking

squarely

to

intoxication

fit within the

rights of others" standard,

intending

to

"knowing disregard

later
of the

e.g., Anderson v. Amundson, 354

N.W.2d 895 (Minn. App. 1984); Huff v. Chrismonn, 315 S.E.2d
711 (N.C. App. 1984); Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854
(Cal. 1979); Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 1973); Adams
v. Hunter, 343 F.Supp.

1284

(D. S.C.

1972); Walezak

v.

Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. 1971); Holmes v. Hollingsworth,
352 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1961); Infeld v. Sullivan, 199 A.2d 673
(Conn. 1964); Madison v. Wigal, 153 N.E.2d 90

(111. App.

1958).
As stated in Holmes v. Hollingsworth, supra.:
"When Miller imbibed alcoholic liquor he
knew that he was taking into his stomach
a substance that would stupefy his
senses, retard his muscular and nervous
reaction, and impair, if not destroy,
the perfect co-ordination of eye, brain
and muscles that is essential to safe
driving.
After
Miller
voluntarily
rendered himself unfit to operate a car
properly he undertook to drive his
automobile, a potentially lethal machine, down a well traveled highway.
His conduct in doing this was distinctly
anti-social, and the jury was amply
authorized in saying by their verdict
that he was exhibiting a 'wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others. ,M (352 S.W.2d at 99)

POINT IV
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED
IN ADDITION TO ANY CRIMINAL PENALTIES
Defendant
necessary

because

argues that punitive damages
drunk

drivers
6

are

subject to

are not
criminal

penalties.

(See Brief of Respondent

at pp. 27-32.)

It

should be sufficient to note that criminal penalties have
not stopped the carnage I

Nor did they deter the defendant.

In spite of Utah's tough laws, many are not deterred and
flout the criminal system.
Those courts which have considered the argument
that punitive damages should not be awarded in drunk driving
cases because criminal penalties exist have
rejected the argument.

consistently

Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or.

1973); Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Svejcara
v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167

(New Mex. App. 1971); Miller v.

Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 2983

(Ark. 1948); Pratt v. Duck, 191

S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 1945).

These courts have determined

that the carnage caused by drunk driving requires use of the
law's full arsenal.
The Oregon Supreme Court expressed its belief that
punitive damages add to the deterrent which the criminal law
provides in these words.
Indeed, the fact of common knowledge
that the drinking driver is the cause of
so many of the more serious automobile
accidents is strong evidence in itself
to support the need for all possible
means of deterring persons from driving
automobiles after drinking, involving
exposure to awards of punitive damages
in the event of accidents.
It may be debatable whether either
awards of punitive damages or the
imposition of criminal penalties will
effectively deter persons from driving
after drinking. However, in the absence
of a showing of substantial evidence to
the contrary, we are not prepared to
hold that law enforcement officials and
7

courts, who have a heavy responsibility
in this area, are wrong in their present
apparent assumption that both criminal
penalties and awards of punitive damages
may have at least some deterrent effect
in dealing with this serious problem.
We are also not aware of any good
reasons why punitive damages should not
have as much deterrent effect upon this
type of wanton and reckless conduct as
upon other types of conduct in which
awards of punitive damages are traditionally approved by the courts.
Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211,
214-215 (Or. 1973).
The
belief

that

Florida
the

Supreme

state's

Court

public

expressed

policy

required

punitive damages in the drunk driving context.
The distinctions articulated in labeling
particular conduct as "simple negligence" , and "willful and wanton misconduct" are best viewed as statements of
public policy. . .We would deceive
ourselves, however, if we viewed these
distinctions as finite legal categories
and permitted the characterization alone
to cloud the policies they were created
to foster. Our guide is not to be found
in the grammar, but rather in the policy
of the state in regard to highway
accidents.
From that perspective, we
see that the courts and the legislature
have evolved the notion that drunk
drivers menace the public safety and are
to be discouraged by punishment.
Ingram
v.
Pettit,
340
So.2d,
922-924, (Fla. 1976) .
New York courts have recognized that:
"the possible imposition of a court
penalty in the form of punitive damages
may well be, at least to some drivers, a
more
effective
deterrent
than
any
possible criminal penalty."
Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306,
310 (1973).

8

a

similar
use

of

POINT V
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES DOES NOT
VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROVISIONS
The

overwhelming

majority

of

jurisdiction

that

have ruled on the issue have held that punitive damages can
be

awarded

even

though

punished criminally.

the

same

conduct

could

also be
2
25 C.J.S. "Damages" §122 at n. 10.

Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 355 So.2d 1116 (Ala.
1978); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293
(1948) ; ~Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal. 532, 18 P. 668 (1888);
E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 42 Colo. App. 497, 596
P.2d 413 (1979); Jefferson v. Adams, 4 Harr. 321 (Del.
1845); Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117 (1882); Klam v. Koppel,
63 Idaho 171, 118 P.2d 729 (1941); Brannon v. Silvernail, 81
111. 434 (1876); Hauser v. Griffith, 102 Iowa 215, 71 N.W.
223 (1897); Donley v. Amerada Petroleum, 152 Kan. 518, 106
P.2d 652 (1940); Doerhoefer v. Shewmaker, 123 Ky. 646, 97
S.W. 7 (1906); Johnson v. Smith, 64 Me. 553 (1875); Elliot
v. Van Buren, 3 Mich. 49" (1875) ; Boetcher v. Staples, 27
Minn. 308, 7 N.W. 263 (1880); Wagner v. Gibbs, 80 Miss. 53,
31 So. 434 (1902); Summers v. Keller, 152 Mo. App. 626, 133
S.W. 1180 (1911); mod on other grounds 262 Mo. 324, 171 S.W.
336 (1914); Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman
Associates, Inc., 108 N.J. Super 137, 260 A.2d 248 (1970);
Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971);
Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973);
Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72
S.E.
610
(1911);
Smithhisler v. Putter, 157 Ohio St. 497, 105 N.E.2d 868
(1952); Roshak v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560 P.2d 275
(1977); Wirsing v. SmithT"222 Pa. 8, 70 A. 906 (1908);
Edwards v. Wessinger, 65 S.C. 161, 43 S.E. 518 (1903); Pratt
v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945); Jones v.
Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022 (1943); Goldsmith's
Administrator v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488, 17 A. 1010 (1889);
Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S.E. 800 (1920);
Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W.VA. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895); Fahrenberg
v. Tengel, 96 Wis.2d 211, 291 N.W.2d 516 (1980); Cosgriff v.
Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, 68 P. 206 (1902).
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Several of the drunk driving cases have specifically rejected the double jeopardy defense.
Whitman, 487 P.2d

167

Svejcara v.

(New. Mex. App. 1971);

Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293

Miller v.

(Ark. 1948); Pratt v. Duck, 191

S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 1945).
Numerous Utah cases have awarded punitive damages
in situations where the same conduct could also be punished
criminally.

e.g., Holdaway v. Hull, 505 P.2d

295

(Utah

1973); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Evans v.
Garsfad, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah 1952).

Indeed, many other kinds

of Utah cases where punitive damages were allowed would
probably also be crimes if prosecutors had known of them or
desired to prosecute them.
Courts which have rejected

the double

defense have done so on various grounds.

jeopardy

Many courts have

pointed out that the term "jeopardy" has a special meaning
which has been applied only to

criminal actions.

E.F.

Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 42 Colo. App. 497, 596 P.2d
413 (1979); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167
(1971); Brown v. Swinefad, 44 Wis. 282 (1878).
Other courts have noted that the criminal statutes
are to punish a defendant for a wrong done to the public in
general, while civil actions arise out of a wrong to a
particular person with punitive damages to be awarded as an
example

to deter others.

e.g., Moody v. State ex rel.

Payne, 355 So.2d 1116 (Ala. 1978); Morris v. McNacNab, 135
A.2d 657

(1957); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M.

App. 1971); Pratt v. Duck, 191 S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 1946).
10

In these civil cases, it is the actions of a private litigant,
not the power and resources of the state, that begins the
process.
Further,

the

requirements

for

imposing

punitive

damages are different from those required for conviction of the
criminal

offense.

One

cannot be

required

damages unless he inflicts actual damages.

to pay

punitive

Maw v. Weber Basin

Waterconservancy District, 436 P.2d 230 (Utah 1968).

The crime

of drunk driving occurs when the statute is violated whether or
not damage occurs.
Another difference is that the crime of drunk driving
only

requires

that

the

statutory

blood-alcohol

exceeded or that alcohol impair driving ability.

level

be

Proving the

crime of drunk driving does not require proof of express or
implied malice.

Awarding

punitive

damages

requires

such a

finding.3
Given the fact that prosecutors cannot prosecute all
criminal acts, society's need to deter such behavior should not
rest fully on their shoulders.

Historically, analytically, and

by the overwhelming weight of authority, civil punitive damages
are not inconsistent with the double jeopardy protection.

In this connection, it is important to realize that
plaintiff is not arguing that drunk driving in and of itself
requires an award of punitive damages.
Rather, plaintiff
simply argues that proof of drunk driving is enough evidence of
implied malice to present a jury question on punitive damages.
Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 1973). Also, even if there
is some overlap in the proof required to establish the crime of
drunk driving and civil punitive damages, no mechanism exists
for trying the criminal and civil matters in one action.
11

POINT VI
THE COURTfS DAMAGE INSTRUCTION WAS
PREJUDICIAL UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
As set forth in our opening memorandum, a tortfeasor is liable for the entire damages when his conduct
causes

a pre-existing,

become symptomatic.

but

asymptomatic,

abnormality

(Appellant1s Brief, pp. 24-29.)

to
The

term "lighting up" or "lit up" is a shorthand way of describing such a situation.
§461, Illustrations and 2.

Restatement, (Second) of Torts
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Ut.2d 364,

412 P.2d 451 (1966) expressly recognizes the general rule by
stating in just so many words that a person with a preexisting

condition

may

recover

for

"any

aggravation

or

lighting up of such a pre-existing condition or abnormality."

(Id.)
The court's instruction was not proper under the

facts of this case.

The trial court's instruction expressly

told the jury that plaintiff could not recover anything for
the pre-existing

condition.

(R. 305.)

To be sure, the

court's instruction stated that the jury "should consider"
aggravation.

But unlike plaintiff's instruction, it did not

go on to state that she could recover for any lighting up.
After explicitly stating that plaintiff could not recover

12

for her pre-existing condition, the court's instruction only
4
told the jury half of what plaintiff could recover for.
The failure to inform the jury that it could award
damages for the entire injury if they found that plaintiff's
pre-existing condition was asymptomatic prior to the accident
was prejudicial under the facts of this case. Regardless of how
adequate such an instruction may have been where the theory of
the case does not

involve the claim

that the pre-existing

condition was asymptomatic prior to the accident, it was not a
fair instruction in this case.
Defendant also ignores the fact that the instruction
only invited the jury to "consider" aggravation in awarding
punitive damages.

It did not instruct the jury that it "had"

to

for

award

damages

aggravation.

As

pointed

out

in the

opening brief, if the jury believed some aggravation occurred,
it was

required

to

award

something

(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-24.)

for

that

aggravation.

The amount of damages is

The trial court's instruction reads as follows:
You are instructed that the damages that may be
assessed in this case should not be reduced simply because
the plaintiff may suffer from a pre-existing or abnormal
condition. If you find that the plaintiff suffers from an
abnormal or pre-existing condition which has not been
proximately caused by the accident, even though it may
invite your sympathy, you may not assess any damage against
the defedant for that condition. However, if the accident
has been a proximate cause of aggravating such pre-existing
or abnormal condition, that should be considered by you in
determing general damages. (R. 305.)
13

discretionary, but the requirement that something be awarde*
for the aggravation is not if the jury found there was som
aggravation.
Because of the lack of direction given by the court1
instruction, the

record

does

not

show whether

the

genera

damages of $500.00 the jury award included a determination o
whether
small

the pre-existing

award

could

have

condition was
been

for

the

aggravated.

Such

collateral bumps an

bruises causing only temporary pain common to most accidents.
An erroneous instruction is presumptively grounds fc
reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as
whole that the jury was not misled.
710f 715 (Ha. 1978).

Turner v. Willis, 582 P.\

In light of the two separate deficienci*

in the court's instruction, there is a reasonable likelihood •
believe that a more favorable result would have occurred hi
the

court

instructed

the

jury

properly.

Under

tho

circumstances, the determination of damages should be reverse
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, 491 P.2d 1208f 1211 (Ut
1971).

CONCLUSION

Factually, there is at least a jury question on t
issue of whether defendant acted with a conscious reckle
disregard of the rights of others.

Further, the express

public policy of the state precludes dismissal of the punit:
damage claim as a matter of law.
14

As far as compensatory damages are concerned, the
court's instruction did not fairly state the law to be applied
to

this

case.

It also

positive direction.
the punitive

damage

failed

to

give

the

jury

required

The case should be remanded for trial of
issue

and

retrial

of

the

compensatory

damage issue.
DATED this pp*

day of February, 1986.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Royce Biswell
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